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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF

THE STATE

OF

UTAH

CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

16904

\TS.

NOEL OKAMOTO and SUSIE S.
OKAMOTO, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is concerned with a determination of whether
certain admitted facts, together with allegations and admissions
in the

pleadings~can

justify a ruling that the plaintiff in a

condemnation action acquired possession of a property under
the provisions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
(

as ·amended 1967), so as to justify the running of statutory

interest on the final award, e\Ten though no formal Order of
Occupancy was secured by the plaintiff condemner.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court ruled that defendant condemnees were
entitled to receive interest on the stipulated agreed V"alue
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of the property condemned and taken from and after the
date of the filing of the Answer to plaintiff's Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These defendants seek to have this Court affirm the
Judgment, including interest, as awarded by the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has generally recited the skeletal facts
setting forth the procedural sequence of the litigation;
however, respondents do not agree with appellant's statement
that it did not " ... ever enter or take actual possession ... "
of the_ condemned properties, since the quoted phrase raises
the mixed issue of fact and law which was before the lower
Court and which is the subject of this appeal. Further, as
this argument proceeds, it will be necessary to add a few
additional supplemental facts in order to more clearly explain
what events transpired between the time the Complaint
was filed and when the matter was brought before the lower Cour
at the time of the Pre-Trial hearing.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
POSSESSION OF THE CONDEMNED PROPERTIES WAS
SURRENDERED TO PLAINTIFF AT mE TIME mE
ANSWER TO TIIE COMPLAINT WAS SERVED.
In condemnation actions under Utah law the value of
real property taken for public use is determined as of the
date of the Service of Summons:
"78-34-11-- When right to damages deemed to have accrued-For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages,
the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at
the date of the service of summons, and its actual
value at that date shall be the measure of compensation
for all property to be actually taken, ... "
Although the foregoing statute fixes the valuation date,
interest on the value of the property taken begins to run from
the date

the condemn.or takes actual possession of the property

or secures an order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, as
provided in a companion portion of the Code:
" 78-34-9-- Occupancy of premises pending action-Deposit paid into court-- Procedure for payment of
compensation.-- ... and the said judgment shall
include, as part of the just compensation awarded,
interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount
finally awarded as the value of the property and
damages, from the date of taking actual possession
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy,
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; ... "
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-4In this case South Ogden City commenced condemnation
proceedings to acquire vacant land for a new City building
complex. Rather than serve the Complaint through normal
channels, counsel for defendants accepted service of the
Complaint ( R. 6), and simultaneously served an Answer ( R.5)
on plaintiff's attorney .. TheCornplaint contained a special
prayer for relief in the following terms:
" Plaintiff further prays for an Order authorizing
inunediate occupancy of the described premises for
the purpose of commencing construction." ( R. 2)
In addition, the Complaint incorporated therein_
Exhibit "A", which was the Resolution of the City Council
authorizing its attorney to proceed with the matter and to-"3. To obtain from said Court, an Order permitting the
City to take immediate possession and use of said real
property, ... "
( R. 3)

On October 27, 1978, shortly after receiving the Complaint,
defendants' attorney filed and served an Answer admitting the
entire Complaint, but setting up the issue of the valuation of
the property taken:
" 1. Defendants admit
7, and 8.

paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,

"2. Defendants deny that plaintiff has offered to them
an amount of money which represents just compensation
for the properties being condemned."
( R. 5)
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-5Further, the prayer for relief included in the Answer
af firrnatively sought relief for interest in addition to the
fair market value of the lands being taken, in the following
statement:
II

together with interest thereon from the date of
the acceptance of service of Sununons on October 25, 1978,
at the rate of 8% per annum, both before and after
judgment, until paid, ... "
( R. 5)
Relying on plaintiff's representations in the pleadings
that it required immediate occupancy of the lands to connnence
construction, defendants inunediately abandoned and surrendered
the property to the City and discontinued any further use of

* a
it ( R. 25),

representation to the lower Court which was not

disputed by plaintiff. In fact, the subject land is directly
across the street from the present City offices ( R. 26)~ However, the plans for the City complex were not finished and,
as it developed, the delay was rather extensive ( R. 26):
The matter was set for Pre-Trial on November 19, 1979,
at which time the issue of whether plaintiff should pay interest
on any award from the date of acceptance of service of Swmnons
and Complaint arose. At the time it was agreed that the fair
market value of the property would be determined as of October 27,
1978, when acceptance of Service became effective, and in fact
* These page references are found in the Record of South Ogden
City v. Fujiki-- Case No. 16902.
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the parties did subsequently agree as to the fair market value
of the property taken.
At the Pre-Trial hearing plaintiff initially contended
that it was necessary for an Order of Occupancy to issue before
......

interest would run on any award ( R.26-27)n, but subsequently
attempted

to convince the lower Court that it had not acquired

actual possession of 1he property-- contending, as its argument
developed in substance, that " actual" possession of the property
should be synonymous with going on the property and taking
" physical" possession. After argument on the matter the lower
Court issued its ruling as follows:
OGDEN, UTAH

NOVEMBER 19, 1979

11: 30 A.M.

THE COURT: The Court will rule as follows: That in this
Complaint there was an order-- that there was a Complaint filed
alleging a need for and praying for immediate possession of the
properties, and also alleging that they would be offered a
reasonable sum. The Answer denies that they have been offered
a reasonable sum, but admits all other pleadings.
The property apparently is truck farm property.
MR. STINE: Subdivision lots, if the Cburt please, that's
·k

These page ref er enc es are found in the Record of South Ogden
City v. Fujiki-- Case No. 16902.
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THE COURT: Subdivision?
MR. FULLER: The highest and best use would be subdivision, but I think it had been used for crop farming.
TIIE COURT: The only practical use since the Sumnons
was made would not be-- no one can very well use it for a
subdivision.
MR. STINE: The highest and best use-- wasn't it zoned
for a duplex at the time-- it's

residential subdivision. They

had truck farmed it, row cropped it from time to time.
THE COURT: The Court will deem that the state of the
pleadings substantially destroys the value of the property,
and that if the city goes through, they'll have to pay interest-MR. STINE: From the date of-TIIE COURT: -- from the date of the Sunnnons-- from the
date of the Answer when-- as soon as you knew that there wasn't
any issue on it.
MR. STINE: From the date of the Answer?
THE COURT: That's right.

"

THE COURT: Okay. It is the date of theAnswer; as soon
as they knew there was no issue andthe possession could have
lawfully been taken any time they wanted to from then on. The
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value of the property as subdivision property had been
destroyed for the landowner's purposes. Possession has been
taken in the holding of the ground. That is the ruling of the
Court.''

( See R. 13-14)
If defendants had retained possession and the use of the

pr?perty after connnencement of the action, there would be a
logical argument that the constitutional mandate of paying
just compensation would be satisfied, and several Utah cases
so hold. However, under the facts of this case, where the
pleadings emphatically recited the innnediate need for occupancy
of the premises, and where defendants immediately surrendered
and abandoned the property to the City, it would indeed appear
un reasonable to require the property owners to forebear both
the use of their property and the alternative right to recover
interest on its value simply because South Ogden City subsequently realized that there would be delays in getting its
building plans prepared. Certainly, the Complaint and its
attached Exhibit clearly indicated that the City was ready to
go and that it wanted the property immediately. Under the
circumstances, securing a formal Order of Occupancy was totally
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unnecessary.
Plaintiff had possession of the subject property as of
October 27,1978, within the meaning of Section 78-34-9.
Plaintiff cites several Utah cases in support of its
position that interest is not allowable under the facts of this
case, but each and every cited case is inapposite; rather, a
careful reading of the cases

supports the lower Court's ruling

that interest should be paid on the award under the facts of
this case. In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147,
80 Pac. 732, an award of interest was denied where the property
owner retained both possession and use of the condemned premises.
But in that case, contrary to the facts before this Court, it
was held that the condemner--" ... did not ask for and did not
have possession of said lots, ... " before trial; and" Nor
was there any time when it could have taken possession and
given a writ of assistance therefore until final judgment and
Order of Condemnation." Further, the Court stated that" ...
The condemnor is not required to make that compensation, until
he does take, either actual or constructively."
Plaintiff also cites State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P.2d
630 and State v. Bettilyon, Inc., 17 U. 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420,
but neither case supports plaintiff's position. Peek recognizes
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-10that a taking occurs" .•. when the possession of the property
is actually surrendered, ... "and Bettilyon recognizes that
interest accrues" ... from the time of actual taking of

. ... "
possession
To paraphrase plaintiff's argument in its brief,
plaintiff had actual possession of the subject property both
in " fact" and in " reality". ( Br. 7) In weighing the equities
of this case, plaintiff ought to pay interest on the total award
from the time the property was abandoned and surrendered to the
City.
3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 8.63 states that-" ... the right to interest from the time that payment
ought to have been made until it is actually made
follows as a matter of strict constitutional right."
Similarly, in the case of State of Oregon, by and
through its D 0 T

v. Glenn ( 1979), 602 P. 2d 253, that Court,

interpreting a Constitutional provision similar to that of
Article I,Section 22 of the Utah Constit:Ution, stated:
"Prior decisions of this Court have explained that
the interest award is part of the ' just compensation'
required by Article I,Section 18 of the Oregon
Constitution."
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POINT II
THE CONSTITIJTIONAL MANDATE REQUIRING PAYMENT
OF JUST COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY TECHNICAL PROCEDURAL MANEUVERS
During recent years we have experienced an explosive growth
along the Wasatch Front in northern Utah, one of the results being
reflected in a substantial amount of condemnation activity. Not
all property owners have converted their lands from an established
use, such as row-crop farming as exists in this case, so as to take
immediate advantage of higher and better uses which have developed
in different localities. Property owners have found that they can
continue farming a tract of land, even though it is ripe for subdivision development as here, and that the farming activities will
produce a given economic return and yet allow the owner to hold
on to the property for a sufficient period of time as will reflect
higher values over the years due to population pressures and the
effect of inflation.
On the other hand , by retaining properties and not

inmediately converting them to the highest use to which they
are adaptable at a given time, such open lands are fair game for
condemning agencies

seeking sites for highways, public buildings,
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-12schools and the like. In fact, it is easy to see why condemners
might try to tie up such properties in advance of actual
public needs so as to head off any development of such unimproved lands. In this case, the lands being taken had value
because a subdivider would have purchased them on the date of
the service of Summons for

t~

purpose of constructing single

family residences and duplexes in accordance with South Ogden
City zoning. As Judge Wahlquist recognized, the filing of the
Complaint effectivelycestroyed the highest and best use of
the subject property.
As a result of the foregoing situation, there has developed an interesting and generally effective procedural tactic
on the part of some condemners whereby a property owner can
effectively be denied the recovery of just compensation under
the mandate of Article I, Section 22,

of the Utah Constitution

by maneuvering within the framework of Sections 78-34-11 and
78-34-9. Here is the way it works: The condenmor files and
serves its Complaint, thereby establishing a valuation date
forfu.e property taken; however, to avoid the running of interest,
it does not seek an order of innnediate occupancy. Unless brought
into Court on a motion seeking to dismiss the proceedings or force
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actual taking of possession ( which is no certain remedy for
the landowner in any event), the condemner will often do nothing
until the condenmee forces the matter to trial. This strategy is
being used more and more in an era of rapidly rising land prices,
as we have been experiencing in the past few years.
It is understandable that a condemner might move as rapidly
as possible to file and serve its complaint so as to head off
rising land prices, but to also attempt to avoid the payment of
interest or to recognize ever increasing land values up to the
time of actual trial often borders on unconscionable conduct.
Even if, as here, the statutory rate of interest at 8% per annum
is awarded to the property owner, this is far short of constitutional
just compensation where one must accept market values at the date
of the service of surmnons and complaint (plus 8% interest), when
in fact the market conditions are moving along at an incremental
rate of between 15% and 20% per annum, as was the situation in
South Ogden during 1978 and 1979.
Appellant seeks both to freeze market values in this case
as of October 27, 1978, and to deny either statutory interest
at 8% per annum or the alternative greater per annum increase in
the market value of the subject properties from and after that date.
The only excuse it can make is that, when it alleged in its
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-14Complaint and Resolution that it needed inunediate occupancy
to commence construction it really didn't mean what it claimed.
Appellant's actions do not square with its argument to this
Court.
In response to a somewhat similar situation in the case o
Kimball v. Salt LakeCity, 32, U. 253, 90 Pac. 395, which
involved a conderrmation proceeding for damages and interest
resulting from a change of the grade of a street in front of a
residence ( brought under Utah Constitution

Article I,Sec. 22),

our Court reflected:
" The adherence to
precedent is no doubt a commendable
judicial virtue, but, if carried to extremes, may
easily, like most virtues, border upon vice. The law
as declared by the Courts should not be permitted to
prevail against valid statutory enactments, and should
in no event curtail or minimize constitutional provisions.
( Emphasis

added)

Appellate courts should ever be mindful of applying
existing statutory and case law to ever changing conditions,
particularly when new and unusual factual developments
permeating an economy must be considered and grappled with.
This case presents a situation requiring a logical and practical
application of the law and facts to the realities of modern
times.
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-15CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's abortive attempt to play hop scotch within
the statutory framework cannot prevail against the superior
and overriding mandate of the Utah Constitution requiring payment of just compensation to property owners who must unwillingly give up their lands through no fault of their own.
Of all legal areas involving court action, the field of eminent
domain should not be one where games are played. 'nle lower
Court accurately analyzed the situation for what it actually
was, and ruled accordingly.
This matter was previously presented to this Court by
plaintiff on a Motion For Summary Reversal of Judgment, pursuant
to Rule 73 B, UtahRules of Civil Procedure, and was orally argued
on April 7, 1980; and the Motion was denied on the same date.
Plaintiff in pursuing this appeal has added little or nothing to
what it presented in its Motion, and it would appear that this
so-called Appeal is nothing more than a re-submission of the
Motion which was denied. The procedure being followed by plaintiff,
even if within the framework of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, certainly does not appear to comport with the spirit
and intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The Judgment of the lower Court awarding interest on the
stipulated award from and after the date of the service of the
Answer on October 2 7, 197 8, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

GLEN E. FULLER
678 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendants-Responder
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